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Abstract 
Wright poses us the challenge of building a world of equality while working 
in the world of today. This article addresses the challenge of transitioning to 
a degrowth economy and eco-socialism which focuses on distribution over 
production and which requires a strong ethic of equality at the heart of society. 
Degrowth aims to address over-consumption by addressing real need, reducing 
wants, ensuring greater distributive equality and ultimately by suppressing 
production. However, the detailed mechanisms of how a steady-state economics 
can provide a quality of life and employment, eliminate poverty and promote an 
egalitarian society require immense work to flesh out. This article points in the 
desired direction of travel and outlines some initial steps. It fleshes out two key 
obstacles to degrowth, the issue of employment and the impact for revenue and 
expenditure arising from a move towards degrowth. It points to the relevance 
of degrowth arguments for feminist and democratic movements and how the 
degrowth strategy offers potential for new political coalitions. It concludes by 
reflecting on the limitations of symbiotic transformative strategies and the need 
for a language capable of imagining and articulating real utopias.
Key words: degrowth, eco-socialism, employment, care, political alliances, 
imaginaries 
Introduction 
Wright (2013) identifies two foundational principles for alternatives:
• an egalitarian principle of social justice where in a socially just society, all 
people would have broadly equal access to the social and material means 
necessary for living a flourishing life; 
• a principle of radical democratic empowerment where, in a fully 
democratic society, all people would have broadly equal access to the 
necessary means to participate meaningfully in decisions about things 
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which affect their own lives as separate persons, and their capacity to 
participate in collective decisions which affect their lives as members of a 
broader community
Taking such democratic egalitarian principles seriously requires moving 
beyond capitalism and the question for Wright is how best to theorise the al-
ternative that would better enable the realisation of such democratic egalitarian 
principles. An economic structure can be more or less capitalist, more or less 
socialist, more or less statist and different alternatives for transformation or in-
stitutional innovations can be located within three broad configurations, each 
of which corresponds to different political traditions of socio-economic trans-
formation: a socialist cluster, a social economy cluster and a social democratic 
cluster. All engage to some degree or other in shifting social power and moving 
towards equality and social justice and environmental sustainability. Core to 
transformation is a shift in power relations over economic activity, both in terms 
of the ways social power is directly involved in shaping economic activity and 
indirectly through the democratisation of the state. For Wright transformation 
depends on the ability to enlarge and deepen the ‘social’ and statist component 
of the hybrid and weaken the market component.
Transformation requires understanding the ways in which strategies of trans-
formation have some prospect in the long term of eroding capitalist power 
relations and building up socialist alternatives. Wright identifies three strategic 
logics of transformation that have characterised the history of anti-capitalist 
struggle: ruptural transformations envision creating new emancipatory insti-
tutions through a sharp break with existing institutions and social structures. 
Interstitial transformations seek to build new forms of social empowerment 
in the niches, spaces and margins of capitalist society. These potentially erode 
the constraints on the spaces themselves but also serve a critical ideological 
function of showcasing alternatives. Symbiotic transformations deepen the in-
stitutional forms of popular social empowerment while simultaneously helping 
solve certain practical problems; ‘non-reformist reforms’ simultaneously make 
life better within the existing economic system but expand the potential for 
future advances of democratic power. 
Wright concludes that the appropriate orientation towards strategies of social 
transformation is to do things now which put us in the best position to do more 
later, to work to create those institutions and structures which increase, rather 
than decrease, the prospects of taking advantages of whatever historical oppor-
tunities emerge. He concludes the best prospect is a strategic package mainly 
organised around the interplay of interstitial and symbiotic strategies, with 
episodic aspects of ruptural strategy. This article explores policy reforms in 
Ireland that could potentially move us in meaningful ways towards eco-socialism 
and is firmly in the symbiotic transformative mode aiming to simultaneously make 
life better within the existing economic system but expand the potential for 
future advances of democratic power or, as Wright puts it, ‘to take the first step’. 
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Degrowth addesses over-consumption measures that can suppress production. 
This can mean addressing the construction of wants through controls of adver-
tising but central to all conceptions of a degrowth economy and eco-socialism 
is the primacy of distribution over production, thus involving a strong ethic of 
equality at the heart of society. However, the detailed mechanisms of how a 
steady-state economics can provide a quality of life and employment, eliminate 
poverty and promote a radical egalitarianism, require immense work to flesh 
out. Given the scale of the task there are no blueprints, nor should there be; 
rather the challenge Wright poses is to point in the desired direction of travel 
and take the first steps. The remainder of this article attempts to flesh out 
two key obstacles to degrowth, the issue of employment and the impact for 
revenue and expenditure arising from a move towards degrowth. It points to the 
relevance of degrowth arguments for feminist and democratic movements, how 
these movements can contribute to degrowth agendas and how the degrowth 
strategy offers potential for new political coalitions. The conclusion reflects on 
the capacity and limitations of symbiotic transformative strategies and the need 
to develop a language capable of imagining and articulating real utopias.
Jobs and degrowth 
In discussing why sustainable development has failed, Smith observes that no 
government will realistically impose ‘green taxes’ or degrowth strategies that 
might drive industries out of business (Smith 2011: 117). Addressing over-
consumption by forcing major retrenchments or suppressing production would, 
in a capitalist system, hasten recession and mass unemployment. There are 
clear obstacles to the type of eco-socialism and degrowth strategies described in 
Kirby’s article in this special edition. The most obvious, particularly in a time of 
high unemployment, is the perceived negative relationship between degrowth 
and levels of employment. 
We should not underestimate or overestimate the degree to which a focus on 
reducing the imperative for growth will impact on jobs. The growth imperative 
in capitalism is not to produce goods per se, it is to make profit or to accumulate 
capital. Financialised capital can realise profits without any tangible or virtual 
production or service. Likewise there are many ways profit can be made 
without material production or consumption, including recreational services, 
sports, movies, opera, internet services, albeit these involve some level of 
carbon emissions. Galbraith (2008) writes that only 17 per cent of employment 
is required to service production thus showing that shifting employment away 
from production will not hit a large proportion of today’s labour force (although 
his argument is based on post-industrial Western developed economies). It is 
possible therefore to imagine opportunities for radical restructuring that do not 
have to involve large-scale unemployment. Alternative paradigms will involve 
a shift from jobs that produce ‘goods’ for consumption to jobs that maintain 
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goods for use. The focus in Smith’s words has to ‘be on shareable and durable 
goods’, avoiding built-in obsolescence and developing a renewed emphasis on 
the commons (Smith 2011). Davis argues that we have the technology to create 
the goods we need with just a minimal input of labour, that economic crisis 
offers the possibility of a large-scale restructuring of both public and private 
sectors and that there is much to learn from new forms of organising production 
(Davis 2012: 36). 
That said, significant levels of profitable investment, capital accumulation 
and growth are derived from growth in material production or exploitation of 
natural resources with significant implications for greenhouse gas emissions. 
As Smith argues, ‘capitalism means perversely, that it is in the general interest, 
in everyone’s immediate interests to do all we can to maximise growth right 
now, therefore, unavoidably, maximising fossil fuel consumption right now – 
because practically every job in the country is, in one way or another, dependent 
upon fossil fuel consumption’ (Smith 2011: 122). As Trainer argues, drastic 
contraction of production in the industrialised countries, especially in the most 
polluting industries, implies large-scale reductions in the volumes of economic 
production and consumption taking place with implications for living standards, 
for maximum levels of economic output, and for economic growth (Trainer 
2010). Indeed many radicals have at this time of austerity become at least 
temporary advocates of growth. Even though they are not avid supporters of 
consumer capitalism, they are acutely concerned about the human tragedy of 
unemployment. Gillespie (2013) raises the apparent folly of cries for degrowth 
at a time when ‘glimmers of growth’ are appearing and when people are hopeful 
that growth might offer a route out of recession and austerity in most developed 
countries. 
Writing in a contemporary South African context, Cock (2011) is realistic 
about how fears of job loss can impact on the capacity to build alliances 
between environmental and trade union movements and she cautions realism 
in the debate. She argues against large inflated claims about green jobs that are 
not supported by empirical evidence, and urges greater attention to the quality 
of green jobs in terms of labour standards and wage levels. She also places 
greater emphasis on the degree to which green jobs are actually green and she 
acknowledges that there will be significant job losses. Nonetheless she is clear 
that it is possible to develop an agenda for publicly supported decent and useful 
green jobs that meet social needs (Cock 2014). To create green, decent, useful 
jobs in renewable energy requires state intervention, at least in the form of 
supportive policies such as tax rebates, local content criteria and regulations. 
Localisation of agro-ecology could address food security issues, the unem-
ployment crisis and the environmental crisis at the same time. The local state 
could accelerate this kind of intervention by changing its procurement policies 
to require state institutions to procure a proportion of their food requirements 
from local suppliers. She crucially emphasises the win-win nature of such an 
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approach: ‘Green jobs in these two areas: renewable energy and urban ag-
riculture, can help us address all of the three crises we face – the crises of 
climate, unemployment and food security – in the immediate term’ (Cock 2011: 
241). The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) defines green 
jobs as ‘those in existing and new sectors which use processes and produce 
goods and services aimed at alleviating environmental threats’ (UNEP 2011: 
66). Cock argues that this emphasis on the creation of ‘green’ or ‘climate jobs’ 
challenges the false dichotomy which portrays labour–environmental relations 
as a trade-off between jobs and the environment. Also, in acknowledging the 
reality of job loss, the UNEP demonstrates the need for appropriate measures 
to guarantee a fair transition for potentially affected workers including social 
protection systems that can diminish vulnerability to climate change, economic 
diversification policies and training and requalification programmes.
Translating this into a European debate, the New Marshall Plan for Europe 
compares the employment effects of oil and gas imports to an energy supply 
that is low in carbon emissions. High-carbon oil industries currently support 
2.4 million jobs and high-carbon gas industries support 3.6 million jobs. EU 
estimates for low-carbon energy jobs include 17 million energy-efficiency jobs, 
10–11 million jobs in renewable energy and 16 million jobs in transport in-
frastructure. They concur that ‘a fundamental overhaul of European national 
economies in terms of energy policy would yield between 9–11 million new 
fulltime and innovative jobs’ (ICTU 2014: 9).
There is a strong correlation between annual working hours and ecological 
outcomes: indeed one outcome of the reduction in aggregate working hours 
caused by recession-related unemployment has been the easier attainment 
of carbon goals. Gough argues there are direct environmental gains from the 
reduction in aggregate demand that would result from a reduced working week 
(Gough 2013). Reduced income will directly reduce consumption and more time 
available for personal life can alter the composition of consumption towards 
lower carbon-intensity products and lifestyles. While the overall logic and 
rationale of such an argument is strong, there are clear distributional, class and 
gender dilemmas in how a policy shift towards reduced working hours would 
play out. Reduced working hours for women are already a cause of gender pay 
gaps and pay inequality. European labour markets are increasingly characterised 
by the presence of jobless or low-work intensity households alongside job-rich 
or high-work intensity households. There is the risk of poverty among the low 
paid, of dual labour markets based on different levels of work intensity, and 
therefore higher levels of precarious work practices. Taxation, social and labour 
market policies would have to adequately address issues of in-work income 
support and incentives for both employees and employers. 
Any successful argument for degrowth or any discussion of the relationship 
between labour market strategies and growth has to engage with the issue of 
how people access employment, and how the resource of paid work and the 
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reciprocal obligation of unpaid care work can both be shared more equally. 
Degrowth is not about the ‘end of work’, but it does look at the type, quality and 
distribution of work. It is concerned with who has the jobs, the working week, 
job quality, care, life-long learning and work autonomy. This should involve a 
focus on the distribution of work (paid and unpaid), care (paid and unpaid) and 
income. This implies an emphasis on service and care work and local provision-
ing. Gough argues that there are already interesting lessons in strategies aimed 
at reducing working time (Gough 2013). Various countries, including Germany, 
have reduced the working week as a strategy to manage the crisis and are ex-
perimenting with new forms of limiting working time. A 2014 Swedish pilot 
project is experimenting with six-hour working days in city councils and France 
has recently curtailed employers’ invasion into staff’s social and private time 
between 6p.m. and 9a.m. while also banning work from 9p.m. to 6a.m. unless 
that work plays an important role in the economy or has clear social benefit 
(Slattery 2014). There is a growing awareness that work or human labour has an 
ecological footprint. The EuroMemo group (2013) argues for a 30-hour week 
and for a 21-hour week in challenging the fetishism of growth. Despite the crisis 
there is passion in the labour movement for the slogan ‘working shorter to live 
longer’ (Passchier 2014). 
Taxation 
A second obstacle to degrowth is the fear of lost revenue and a lost capacity to 
fund the level of social investment required to achieve degrowth and support 
even minimal social standards within an eco-socialist or even social democratic 
model. The current crisis has already highlighted the degree to which Ireland’s 
contemporary taxation system is over-reliant on income taxation as a source of 
revenue. This means, at least in the short-term, an anxiety about the degree to 
which changes in the composition and distribution of employment might impact 
on taxation. An obvious obstacle to lowering the number of total hours worked 
in paid employment is the implication for revenue generation and the impact on 
overall fiscal sustainability. Who will pay the taxes for services and who will 
pay for the public sector jobs and large state infrastructure envisioned in an eco-
socialist economy?
 To begin with, we know little about what impact a major redistribution 
between paid employment on the one hand, and unpaid and community work 
on the other may have on our well-being. There remains the possibility that, 
especially in the longer term, education, health and housing costs will be lower 
and there will be less stress on public expenditure. However, even if we expect 
government expenditure to remain at approximately similar levels of GDP 
(which in the Irish case is relatively low) we do need to find ways to replace 
employment-related taxation as a primary source of revenue. Ungar (2013) 
identifies various sources of income that EU member countries could use to 
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invest in social policies. While necessarily brief, this section highlights four 
potential sources of revenue that remain underrealised in capitalist regimes: 
financial transaction taxes, wealth taxes, production and energy taxes and con-
sumption taxes. 
The recent financial crisis has renewed interest in a financial transactions 
tax (FTT). According to the Nevin Institute (2013), an FTT would allow states 
to more adequately monitor the financial sector, provide additional taxation 
revenue, and reduce the volume of high-risk financial transactions. The European 
Commission and Parliament have proposed an FTT which is being implemented 
in twelve member states; such an FTT would be structured to capture activities 
in all markets, through all instruments and among all actors. Estimates for the 
potential yield vary widely with ICTU estimating a range of from €70 billion 
to €320 billion for an FTT that covered all derivatives and foreign exchange 
(ICTU 2014). The Nevin Institute (Collins 2013) makes a conservative claim 
that an FTT could raise €34 billion each year and that this could address poverty 
and inequality by funding quality public services while curbing intense specu-
lative trading. To date, Ireland has been unwilling to support the FTT proposal 
which could produce a net tax gain of between €300–550 million per annum for 
Ireland but there are active campaigns with Irish civil society towards this end.
Globally Ungar (2013) estimates that the amount hidden in private and 
corporate legal tax avoidance measures and illegal tax evasion methods to be 
up to US$32 trillion in offshore financial assets. Focusing on one country as an 
example, she suggests that taxing only 0.2 per cent of the richest Germans by 
1 per cent of their wealth would result in an annual tax revenue of €8.9 billion 
(Ungar 2013: 97). Corporation tax is a potential source of revenue, with the 
global focus on the need to address glaring tax loopholes in taxing multinational 
corporations, and there is extensive scope for Ireland to reform its corporation 
taxes. The capacity of individuals and corporations to engage in serious tax 
avoidance and evasion strategies means there are serious limitations to national 
wealth taxation strategies. Picketty (2014) proposes overcoming avoidance and 
tax mobility through a global progressive tax on individual net worth which 
would be internationally coordinated to manage tax avoidance. In the same vein 
ICTU (2014) join other European unions in calls for a regional EU level wealth 
tax of 3 per cent on all wealth in excess of €500,000 for single and €1,000,000 
for married couples which has the capacity to raise €200–250 billion across 
Europe. Galbraith dismisses such ideas as utopian: 
[T]o begin with, in a world where only a few countries accurately measure high 
incomes, it would require an entirely new tax base, a worldwide Domesday Book 
recording an annual measure of everyone’s personal net worth. That is beyond the 
abilities of even the NSA. And if the proposal is utopian, which is a synonym for 
futile, then why make it? (Galbraith 2014: 1) 
There are ways to tax wealth. At a domestic level we can think in the first 
instance about how to maintain or increase tax revenues from existing levels 
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of productivity and without increasing taxes on labour. This can be done by 
focusing on the wealth of the top 10 per cent or even 1 per cent of the income 
and wealth hierarchies. In an Irish context, Collins proposed ways to gather 
up to €1 billion without significant impact on investment but with significant 
impacts on distribution and on income equality, including gender equality 
(Collins 2013). Measures such as wealth taxes, employers’ social insurance 
taxes, changes to existing income tax reliefs and exemptions, corporation taxes, 
capital gains taxes and capital acquisition taxes, demonstrate significant op-
portunities to increase revenue by redistributing existing resources. Such an 
approach is consistent with ‘challenging the place of the rich’ (Sachs 2013: 27). 
Given the degree to which wealthy Irish nationals already live as tax exiles, 
the possibility of tax flight needs to be taken seriously. However, the room for 
manoeuvre in increasing some forms of wealth tax was demonstrated over the 
crisis when various initiatives to tax wealth flow were successfully implement-
ed, including a doubling of capital gains taxes, capital acquisition taxes and the 
introduction of a property tax. 
The third avenue to addressing revenue shortfalls is taxing production and 
specifically taxing environmentally damaging forms of production that use dis-
proportionate energy, especially non-renewable energies. It is appreciated that 
such taxes need very careful design and a global implementation strategy if they 
are to work. Herman Daly makes a compelling case for shifting from income 
taxation to forms of resource taxation in the form of ecological taxes (Daly 
2007). This necessarily entails protecting remaining commons and limiting the 
further expansion of the economy into the eco-system, what in Polanyian terms 
would result in a decommodification of nature. Ecological tax reform means 
imposing taxes at the source of depletion of the natural resource. Daly argues 
that such taxation reflects the necessary valorisation price or scarcity rent that 
we place on scarce environmental public goods, it raises resource prices and 
encourages more efficient use of such scare resources in both production and 
consumption. Regressive impacts can be lessened by ensuring that revenues 
raised from such taxation would be used to alleviate poverty and finance the 
provision of public goods.
The fourth arena for taxation is to shift towards taxing the consumption of 
goods, and particularly towards taxes that can produce behavioural changes in 
what we consume and how we consume. These are not new ideas (and have 
been around for a long time in relation to smoking and tobacco). Artificial 
demand could also be dampened by high taxes on advertising (indeed we could 
go further by banning billboard advertising as was done in Vermont, Hawaii, 
Maine and Alaska and banning advertisements of children’s toys). The focus 
for consumption taxes should be on luxury goods and goods entailing high 
emissions. Such taxes serve to modify preferences and consumption behaviour 
and to constrain total consumption demand. However the broader use of con-
sumption taxes on more everyday goods may also be necessary, but this raises 
distributional dilemmas. There are potentially significant regressive impacts 
Irish Journal of Sociology84
from non-luxury goods consumption taxes, so that they need to be modified or 
complemented with creative social policy that can mitigate regressive impacts. 
Gough makes a novel argument for an ‘eco social policy’; forms of proactive 
social investment alongside climate mitigation policy so that environmental and 
social policy goals complement rather that contradict each other (Gough 2013: 
191). Compensating social policies can include direct income compensation 
like fuel payments, reduced energy bills through variable energy prices, and 
thermal efficiency policies like retrofitting. He argues that addressing energy ef-
ficiencies is the preferred policy option, it is most tightly targeted and is closely 
aligned with ecological goals. 
The concept of tax justice or using tax policy to achieve ecological and social 
justice goals can be dismissed as utopian but this is also to dismiss the growing 
social power behind demands for tax justice. Marshall (2013) celebrates 
high-profile Robin Hood Tax rallies during 2012 G8 and Rio+20 Earth summits 
and campaigns in countries as diverse as Brazil, the United States and South 
Africa. The Global Alliance for Tax Justice was formed early in 2013, and ‘tax 
justice for social justice’ was the call at the World Social Forum in Tunisia in 
March 2013 when 240 leading civil society and labour organisations signed 
the Fair Share Commitment on World Public Services Day 2013. Taxation has 
the potential to generate the type of cross-class and cross-sector alliances that 
McCabe (in this special issue) argues are necessary to challenge power and 
achieve transformation. 
Equality and democracy 
There is a strong gender dimension to this debate and degrowth debates overlap 
with the policy agendas that seek to accommodate and redistribute care work. 
Schultz and Hoffman advocate the restructuring of and reduction in working 
time to decrease stress, increase gender equality in working time, and facilitate 
the achievement of work–life balance (in Fudge and Owens 2006). They argue 
that stronger employee representation, more effective government monitoring 
and enforcement capacity, and the creation of norms which allow and encourage 
reduced working time would advance this agenda. The framework in Figure 1 
is useful in visioning alternative ways to share and balance reproductive care 
and productive work, to understand how they interrelate, and to analyse how to 
break patterns of path dependencies.
At stage one, typologies like ‘male bread winner’ or ‘modernised male 
breadwinner’ reflect deeply differentiated gender roles where women perform 
‘wifely labour’ (Shaver and Bradshaw 1995). In stage two, ‘mother /worker’ 
models reinforce gender differentiation while acknowledging the dual roles 
women undertake as mothers or carers, and increasingly as workers. In stage 
three, ‘adult worker’ models see both adults in paid employment and purchasing 
commodified care, similar to what Fraser (1994) terms ‘universal breadwinner’. 
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Stage four, the ‘carer /worker’ model, is a feminist approach informed by a care 
ethic and the concept of affective equality, and greater sharing between men 
and women of both care and paid employment (Hobson 2003). This approach is 
similar to both Fraser’s 1994 seminal approach and her universal care-giver, as 
well as the European concept of the individual carer–earner regime (Sainsbury 
1999) which includes well-developed gender-equality friendly policies 
(Sorensen and Bergqvist 2002). The focus on accommodating work and care 
for mothers and fathers implies a residual need for care which may be provided 
by the market or the state. It requires state policy to enable sharing of care with 
intervention at the level of the family and the market to promote family-friendly 
policies for both men and women, as well as the promotion of male care roles 
through paid parental leave (Lewis and Guillari 2005).
Restoring democratic power and economic power are intrinsically linked 
and if degrowth can create time in people’s lives it can also serve to enhance 
democratic participation in the workplace. Schultz argues for a third path in 
which we not only redistribute care roles between men and women, so enhancing 
gender equality, but also increasing our capacity to invest our time in our imagi-
naries. As she argues, ‘spinning in the overwhelm keeps us from having the time 
to imagine a way out of it’ (Schultz 2013). What is needed are further imaginar-
ies or thought experiments along the lines of Fraser (1994) that enable us to see 
the possible combination of work, care and time for democracy and flourishing 
human relations that can realise Wright’s (2013) foundational principles for al-
ternatives: an egalitarian principle of social justice and a radical principle of 
democratic empowerment can be best realised by reimagining the fundamental 
place of care, work, democracy and flourishing in our lives. This gives rise to 
the possibility of new political coalitions including intersectional coalitions of 
labour, gender, environmental and democracy movements of a scale sufficient 
to generate a new politics as shown in Figure 2. 
  
 
Carer/worker 
female and male less than full-time  
care shared equally between male and 
female   
Male breadwinner 
male works full-time, female cares  
Adult worker 
male and female work full-time 
care is fully commodified   
Mother/worker 
male works full-time  
female works part-time/cares full-time  
 
Care/Work 
Typology . 
Figure 1: Typologies of gendered work/care combinations
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As with environmental taxes, eco-social policy has a key symbiotic role 
to play. The choice to work ‘part time’ can be supported through changes in 
employment regulations (as in the Netherlands and Austria). Change in social 
welfare regulations and provisions can facilitate new forms of work (as in the 
Nordic countries). Tax reform with refundable tax credits can better support 
low-income workers (as in some OECD countries). Redistribution of domestic 
and social care work across genders can be encouraged through paid paternal 
leave (as in Sweden and Germany). Investment through state strategies will 
be required to fund and implement these alternatives. Social investment, as 
seen in the EU Social Investment Package (EC 2013), is needed to focus on 
employment in childcare, preventative social services, education and training, 
housing and health provision. Committing a percentage of the EU budgets to 
social investment needs to be a core part of the strategy (EuroMemo Group  2013). 
 Conclusion: restating the case for transformation
The central challenge of an ecological socialism, or an economy for the common 
good, is to curb the imperative of economic growth that is the central driver of 
today’s market economy while at the same time maintaining forms of investment 
and distribution capable of sustaining jobs and adequate income. However there 
are not only limits but also dangers in symbiotic transformational strategies for 
degrowth in that they are nested with capitalism and can also work to reinforce 
rather than transform the status quo. As McCabe observes in this special 
edition, symbiotic transformational strategies are vulnerable to the capacity of 
capitalism to reinvent, usurp and refashion potentially symbiotic changes for its 
own ends. Thus strategies that focus on reduced working time have the capacity 
to be manipulated into strategies that support precarious part-time work and that 
do nothing to alter consumption and production patterns, but can do much to 
 
care work 
flourishing  democratic participation 
degrowth 
Figure 2: Cross-sectional spaces triggered by degrowth
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undermine equality and disempower workers. The challenge is to see how far it 
is possible to maintain an economic system as a system of hybrid ecosystems, 
how far counter-capitalist processes can neutralise in a meaningful way some 
of the harms of capitalism without a fundamental kickback from capitalism. 
Symbiotic reforms genuinely matter in their own right, but they also serve as 
platforms for pushing more radical change. We can only speculate as to the 
threshold at which symbiotic strategies require the elimination of capitalism as 
the necessary condition for their own existence. 
All this requires significant transformation. As Smith rightly points out 
‘under capitalism, industries can’t be expected to voluntarily commit economic 
suicide, even to save the humans’ (Smith 2011: 118). Rather this will only 
happen in the context of a significant transfer of power from the market to the 
state, but especially to the social. Cock (2011) argues this requires a shift from 
focusing on ‘thin’ change, on protecting the most vulnerable workers and the 
poor, as has been the focus of social democratic and developmental states in 
this period of crisis. Instead, it requires an agenda of deep substantive change 
in the ways we produce and consume, to create a more just and sustainable 
social order, developing an alternative socialist order built on public ownership 
and democratic control. From this perspective the climate crisis provides the 
opportunity to demonstrate that the cause of both climate change and economic 
crisis is the expansionist logic of the capitalist system. She argues for an alter-
native anti-capitalist development path and that a ‘just transition to a low carbon 
economy’ could contain the embryo of an alternative eco-socialist order. This is 
consistent with Harvey’s insight that ‘an ethical, non-exploitative and socially 
just capitalism that redounds to the benefit of all is impossible. It contradicts the 
very nature of what capital is’ (Harvey 2010: 239).
Massey reminds us that the vocabulary we use to talk about the economy 
is a political construction that needs contesting; in developing the dominant 
hegemony, the right changed the public use of economic language and thus 
collective world-views. For political contestation to take place, we need to 
question how we think about the economy, in Massey’s words, ‘for something 
new to be imagined, let alone to be born, our current economic “common 
sense” needs to be challenged root and branch’ (Massey 2013: 15). New 
socialism emphasises the development of human beings and the satisfaction 
of social needs through workers’ control, and democratic participatory forms 
of production. Cock advises that to arrive there requires rethinking how we 
produce and consume, rethinking how we relate to nature and each other and 
requires us rethinking how we understand human nature (Cock 2011). She (2014: 
23) points to the South African experience of alliances between the labour and 
environmental movements, which while historically disconnected and even an-
tagonistic, have recently created new solidarity networks to promote radical 
alternatives. She describes unions’ attempts to formulate environmental policies 
and joint action on ‘climate jobs’ and rising electricity prices, and concludes 
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this has the capacity to create new political alliances. She concludes that these 
could generate a new kind of transnational solidarity, larger, deeper and more 
powerful than anything we have yet seen (Cock 2014: 40). 
Our choice of language and words impacts on our capacity to develop 
alliances around shared images of the future. For some, degrowth is the wrong 
debate when the contemporary challenge is to tackle high unemployment; 
for others eco-socialism conjures up images of too strong state power at the 
expense of human emancipation. However if translated into core basic concerns 
like care work, gender equality, democracy and time, the possibilities offered by 
degrowth and the compass setting it offers for the first step in a longer journey 
can be made meaningful to a wider group. 
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